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ABSTRACT. Health Level 7 (HL7) is an organization seeking to provide universal stan-
dards for the exchange of healthcare information. In a document entitled ‘HL7 Version 3 
Standard: Data Types’, the HL7 organization advances descriptions of data types recom-
mended for use as identifiers. We will argue that the descriptions supplied provide insuffi-
cient guidance as to what exactly the entities are which these data types uniquely identify. 
Are they real things, such as persons or pieces of equipment? Or are they representations of 
such real things in information artifacts? We here outline the problems faced by HL7 in pro-
viding answers to such questions, problems which arise because of the lack of anything like 
a coherent ontology in the HL7 standard, and we make some recommendations for future im-
provements. 
1 Introduction 
The mission of the HL7 organization is ‘to provide standards for the exchange, 
management and integration of data that supports clinical patient care and the 
management, delivery and evaluation of healthcare services’.1 The key idea underlying 
its work is that it is possible to create a standard for the formulation of messages 
transmitted between distinct health information systems that would render these systems 
semantically interoperable, in the sense that messages would not merely be transmitted 
from one system to another, but also understood in the same way by human senders and 
receivers.  
In order to realize this goal of semantic interoperability it is thus essential that 
communicating systems convey information in such a way that humans beings – both in 
formulating and in interpreting messages – can understand what these messages are 
about. We believe further that the software engineers charged with developing such 
communicating systems, as well as the HL7 consultants and domain experts that assist 
them in this task, need not only to understand what HL7 messages are about, but also to 
understand the HL7 specifications themselves, and, more specifically, the Reference 
Information Model (RIM), which forms the backbone of HL7’s current Version 3. For 
HL7 to give a coherent account of identifiers that is in accordance with its goals, 
therefore, it is necessary for the RIM to embody a coherent account of the types of 
entities identified, or in other words a coherent ontology, and this HL7 does not have.  
In 2006, we argued that the RIM and its associated documentation in the versions then 
available were dramatically inconsistent and we provided some recommendations for 
improvement.2 The rebuttal that followed did something to explain how the problems of 
inconsistency had arisen (basically because HL7 is a large volunteer organization, with 
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no capacity to coordinate contributions coming in from different sources). It did not, 
however, provide any arguments against our specific claims.3 In August 2007, the HL7 
Board of Directors was reported to have ‘identified the need to review the existing V3 
portfolio of standards for clarity, consistency, and ease of use’.4 Yet we still, in the 
normative version of the HL7 RIM (V02-18 of 9/10/2007, January 2008 Ballot Package 
Preview), find a repetition of the same oft-quoted statement – a statement which in our 
opinion undermines the entire RIM endeavor, to the effect that ‘there is no distinction 
between an activity and its documentation. Every Act includes both to varying degrees.’ 
(Emphasis added.) 
There is of course an obvious internal inconsistency between the last two sentences: if 
there is no distinction between X and Y, thus if X=Y, then what does it mean to say that 
something else includes them both? But more importantly, it surely cannot be, or so we 
hope, that the author of these statements – statements which have been re-approved in 
successive RIM releases – sincerely believes that there is no distinction at all between, 
say, the removal of my appendix and a report of such removal. Perhaps what is meant is 
that if an HL7 expert were to apply all rules and principles offered by the HL7 
machinery in a correct way in order to represent the removal of my appendix, then the 
result would be exactly the same as if he had carried out the same exercise with the goal 
of producing an HL7-conformant representation of some documentation describing that 
removal. But if that is the case, how could we then know what such a representation is 
really about, and how could we uniquely identify the process of removal? How could 
we know that different reports (data elements, records, messages, and so forth) are 
about the same event in reality if there is nothing in the HL7 machinery that 
distinguishes real world items from their documentation? 
The response of the HL7 expert might be: “an HL7 message is always about a report, or 
more broadly about information in general”. The RIM is, after all, a reference 
information model. But why care about entities in reality at all, he may ask? Why 
would we ever need for healthcare message purposes anything other than a simple 
representation of documents alone?  
To see how this distinction might matter in patient care, consider the problems we will 
face on the approach described when we need our information system to keep track of a 
patient and of the records of the care this patient has received in a succession of 
different hospitals over time. We may wish our system to have the capability for 
example to detect inconsistencies between the different assertions expressed in these 
different documents, and to represent not only the patient and her disorders, diagnoses, 
drug interactions, etc., but also how the latter and the interrelationships between them, 
change over time.5 
To support such capabilities, HL7 has introduced into its coding scheme a special 
attribute called ‘.id ’. The objective of the work reported here is to test the hypothesis 
that an appropriate treatment of the distinctions between record and entity can be 
brought about by an adequate use of this attribute. 
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2. Material and methods 
We studied several versions of the HL7 Data Type specifications and other relevant 
documentation up to and including the version included in the January 2008 Ballot 
‘Preview’ distribution as available on March 7, 2008. We performed searches on 
various public HL7 forums for discussions on identification issues, and we participated 
in (and in some cases initiated) such discussions in order to be corrected on possible 
misinterpretations of relevant HL7 texts. We also tried to locate examples of V3-
messages in order to study how instance identifiers are interpreted and used. 
3. Results 
We can distinguish, on the level of general ontological categories, the following 
alternative candidates for entities which given instance identifiers might be used to 
identify: 
 information artifacts such as database entries or documents 
 the contents of information artifacts, such as individual diagnoses or 
measurement results 
 individual processes of creating or amending such artifacts 
 individual objects, such as patients or buildings 
 individual processes, such as acts of observation or surgical operations 
 the types which such individuals instantiate. 
Our conclusion is that, on the basis of our examination of the HL7 documentation (see 
Table 1) and of the opinions expressed by HL7 experts, it is to date still not possible to 
obtain a straightforward answer in the terms of such a list to the question: what is it that 
HL7 instance identifiers identify? 
This is because it is possible to point to aspects of HL7 documentation and practice 
which lend support to various more or less coherently specified alternatives among 
these choices. The general incoherence which we already reported2 as concerns 
interpretation of the RIM’s ‘backbone’ categories of Act, Entity, and Role are thus 
inherited also by HL7’s resources for identifying the entities about which messages are 
formulated. 
This issue is pertinent as, in the absence of a coherent system for unambiguous 
identification, it is for example impossible to obtain reliable counts for the numbers of 
treatment episodes in which given patients participate, or of the disorders they were 
intended to treat. It becomes impossible to estimate how many diagnoses have been 
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formulated for these disorders, how many investigations were carried out in order to 
arrive at, or to falsify, such diagnoses, and so forth. Such counts are determiners for 
quality and cost-effectiveness of care, and they will become increasingly important for 
the healthcare of the future, in which outcomes-based quality assurance will play a 
central role. 
4. The id. Attribute 
A first difficulty for HL7 turns on its different treatment of the ‘.id ’ attribute for the 
classes Entity, Act and Role. When used as attribute of Entity and Act, this results in .id-
expressions which denote some corresponding Entity or Act, respectively (which one 
precisely, as we will see below, still needs to be determined). But this is not so for Role. 
For in the latter case, the resultant identifier expression will denote the Entity playing 
the Role, thus leaving no room for the unique identification of the specific Role played 
by this Entity itself.  
A second difficulty is created by the distinct ways in which Act and Entity are defined: 
the former as a record of an act, the latter is the physical thing itself. 
Table 1. HL7 definitions drawn from RIM, HL7 Glossary, or Data Types 
(DT) documents 
1. Act (RIM): A record of something that is being done, has been 
done, can be done, or is intended or requested to be done. 
2. Act.id (RIM): A unique identifier for the Act. 
3. Procedure (RIM): An Act whose immediate and primary 
outcome (post-condition) is the alteration of the physical con-
dition of the subject. 
4. Observation (RIM): An act that is intended to result in new 
information about a subject. Observations have a value 
attribute. The code attribute of Observation and the value 
attribute of Observation must be considered in combination to 
determine the semantics of the observation. 
5. Observation.Value (RIM): Information that is assigned or 
determined by the observation action. 
6. Entity (RIM): A physical thing, group of physical things or an 
organization capable of participating in Acts, while in a role. 
7. Entity.id (RIM): A unique identifier for the Entity 
8. LivingSubject (RIM): A subtype of Entity representing an 
organism or complex animal, alive or not. 
9. Person (RIM): A Living Subject representing single human 
being [sic] who is uniquely identifiable through one or more 
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legal documents 
10. Role (RIM): A competency of the Entity playing the Role as 
identified, defined, guaranteed, or acknowledged by the Entity 
that scopes the Role. 
11. Role.id (RIM): A unique identifier for the player Entity in this 
Role. 
12. Instance Identifier (DT): An identifier that uniquely identifies 
a thing or object. Examples are object identifier for HL7 RIM 
objects, medical record number, order id, service catalog item 
id, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), etc. Instance identifi-
ers are defined based on ISO object identifiers. 
 
From 6 and 7, we can conclude that the Entity.id attribute associated with a specific 
instance of Entity may denote a real, physical person. On the other hand from 8 and 9  
we would have to conclude that the Person that is a subtype of Entity is not an 
‘organism or [sic] complex animal’ at all, but rather merely something – thus 
presumably some information artifact – that represents an organism. From 1 and 2 we 
may infer that Act instance identifiers denote not physical activities, but rather records 
of such activities. We are then, however, left with an absurdity, when combining 4, the 
RIM definition for Observation. For on the one hand Observations are ‘intended to 
result in new information about a subject’, but on the other hand observations are Acts, 
and thus records. Records, however, cannot of themselves result in new information. 
A third difficulty pertains to a conflict between the RIM specification and the HL7 
datatype specifications (DT) with which the RIM is asserted to be compliant. For the 
examples of instance identifiers given by DT, for example VIN numbers, identify, not 
records or representations, but rather physical objects themselves (or, in the case of 
catalog IDs, kinds of physical objects).  
A fourth difficulty lies in the multitude of ways in which specific values for HL7 class 
attributes affect the interpretation that has to be given to the correspondingly modified 
parts of HL7 messages. Where an instance of Person with determinerCode 
‘INSTANCE’ is said to denote one specific person, matters are fairly clear. If this 
attribute is set to ‘KIND’, however, then we are left with conflicting interpretations:  
 in the RIM Vocabulary Domain we are told that use of the KIND attribute 
signifies that: ‘the given Entity is taken as a general description of a kind of 
thing’,  
 in the RIM documentation we are provided with an example: the population of 
Indianapolis, which is not a kind of thing but rather a particular collection of 
things. (Which collection precisely is still left to our imagination, for based on 
the definition of LivingSubject which generalizes Person to include dead 
persons, it would seem to include all persons who ever lived in Indianapolis. 
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A final difficulty can be summarized as follows: are HL7 experts with the goal of 
applying HL7 ‘correctly’ able to achieve this goal on the basis of the conflicting 
instructions provided by HL7 itself? To address this question we will just note the 
uncertainties which arise for the coder who needs to capture the distinction between (1) 
the ‘act of observing’, and (2) the ‘finding’ to which this observation leads: what 
referent is denoted by Act.id in such a case, and how do Observation.value and 
Observation.code relate to this referent?  
As we demonstrated above, HL7’s definitions of the salient terms cannot help us here, 
because they confuse (or deny) the very distinctions they would need to clarify. The 
HL7 V3 example message6 used in the Ballot package mentioned above serves only to 
entrench the confusion further, since it seeks to have it both ways in one and the same 
message. Thus it codes one ObservationEvent by means of the SNOMED CT code for 
‘protein measurement’ (classified by SNOMED as a procedure, thus as a physical 
process), while for another it uses the SNOMED CT code for ‘finding of organism 
growth’ (classified by SNOMED as a finding, thus as the result of a procedure). 
It is stated by HL7 that ‘the RIM is not intended to represent a particular set of HL7 
messages, but rather the collective universe of data and relationships from which any 
relevant HL7 message could be constructed’.1 We believe that to achieve this end, it 
must be possible to distinguish in explicit fashion at least between:  
(1) the physical process of measuring (for instance measuring my weight, here and 
now) 
(2) the entity that is measured (my weight, something that changes over time)  
(3) the magnitude that is measured (my objective weight at some given instant),  
(4) the obtained value for this magnitude, which may embody some error,  
(5) the act of registering this value in a record,  
(6) the resultant data-element in the record.7  
Sadly, the HL7 RIM does not allow these distinctions to be made coherently. 
5. Discussion 
On the one hand is the realm of information. On the other hand there is the world of 
what this information is about. We believe that many of the shortfalls we have 
identified in HL7-related work arise from its reliance on the so-called semantic or 
semiotic triangle,8 and on its distinction between words, things, and what are called 
‘concepts’. By awarding to concepts in this way, the paradigm gives rise to an 
erroneous expectation on behalf of those who adopt it that there is some well-
demarcated realm of concepts, in addition to the two rather more familiar realms of 
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words and things.  In fact, however, there is no realm of concepts, and thus no way in 
which distinct uses of the term ‘concept’ could be compared for correctness. 
Confusions accordingly arise because of the multiple inconsistent ways in which this 
term is used.9 , 10  The uncertainties as to the meaning of ‘concept’ generate further 
problems when HL7 is brought into relationship with third-party terminologies such as 
SNOMED CT. Such terminologies are themselves largely concept-based, and they, too, 
are typically still unclear about how precisely the term ‘concept’ as they use it is to be 
defined. The task of combining them with HL7 is then analogous to the task of 
combining the plumbing in the front and rear sections of a large hospital in the 
construction of which not only different specifications have been used, but also the 
language in which these specifications are written is understood in multiple different 
ways by those involved. 
Matters are made still worse by the fact that the UML-based modeling language in 
which the HL7 RIM is expressed imposes a view according to which everything has to 
be seen through the lens of an information system so that there is no realm for the 
objects which the information system is about – information and objects are effectively 
identified. 
To overcome these limitations, we suggest that discussions of the necessary radical 
revisions of the HL7 RIM should employ a terminological framework that is capable of 
capturing in an explicit fashion the views of all of those involved, whether they be 
realists (such as ourselves), who hold that there is an objective (though of course never 
fully known and understood) external reality, in which persons really exist, and sicken, 
and die; or semioticians for whom the concept ‘person’ corresponds to some ‘specific 
mass (atoms, molecules, etc.) in the world’,8 or conceptual modelers, who see 
everything through the lens of a UML diagram.8  
To enable coherent communication between such parties, we believe that it is 
indispensable to draw a distinction11 between the four levels of  
L1: objects in reality 
L2: the beliefs and thoughts in people’s minds about such objects 
L3: the expressions of such thoughts in public language. 
L4: the information artifacts used to identify entities on different levels. 
5.1 L1-Entities: The Targets of Referential Acts 
It seems to us to be obvious that Electronic Healthcare Records (EHRs), like paper-
based healthcare records, contain descriptions which are about (or in other words: 
denote or are used to refer to) particular entities in reality. Some of these entities are 
persons: the patient about which a specific EHR is maintained, his relatives, the doctors 
and nurses with whom he came into contact, and so forth. Others are instruments: blood 
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pressure cuffs, reflex hammers, Coulter counters, weight scales, and so forth, that are 
used in investigations conducted by care providers to obtain a better grasp of what 
might be wrong with given patients. Others are disorders, for example a palpable intra-
abdominal mass inside a patient. Such entities are known to us in various ways, whether 
by direct observation, or by more complex processes of investigation, for example 
processes of measuring a baby’s weight, of testing knee reflexes, of observing the gait 
disturbances of a Parkinson patient. All of the above – whether they be patients, or 
disorders, or processes of investigation – are entities in their own right. Such entities 
belong to what, from an ontological perspective based on realism, we shall refer to as 
‘level 1’, the level of real-world entities. We shall refer to them henceforth as ‘L1-
entities’ in order to distinguish them from other types of entities that we will introduce 
below, and to avoid confusion with the putative referents of HL7 terms such as ‘Entity’, 
‘Act’, and ‘Observation’. L1 entities are the potential targets of referential acts. The 
reader should accordingly bear in mind that, since all entities fall under this heading, 
then entities on all of the distinguished levels will be L1 entities also. 
5.2  L2-Entities: Cognitive Artifacts 
Whereas the entities discussed so far are fairly concrete – they can be touched, seen, 
filmed with a video camera, and so forth – other EHR descriptions are about more 
abstract entities such as beliefs on the side of the patient or of the physician. A 
hypothesis, for example to the effect that a given palpable mass inside a patient is 
malignant or benign, is on the level 2 of beliefs. We will refer to entities such as beliefs, 
opinions, and in general any entity that belongs to what is generated in a cognitive 
being’s mind, including what are commonly called ‘cognitive representations’, as ‘L2-
entities’. 
A specific L2-entity can stand in an aboutness relationship to an L1-entity, as when my 
belief in the benign character of the pimple that appeared this morning on my nose 
stands in an aboutness relation to that specific pimple. For this L2-entity to exist, and 
for it to stand in the aboutness relationship that it enjoys with that L1-entity, there must 
have occurred something like an observation of the L1-entity, whether directly or 
through other phenomena such as its sequelae, including reports such as this 
communication. 
Bear in mind that, at any point in time, L1-entities such as pimples and noses are what 
they are (or relate to other L1-entities in precise ways) independently of what a 
cognitive being believes or knows about them. Bear in mind also that L2-entities have 
certain physical counterparts, perhaps in the form of electrophysiological excitations or 
biochemical states in the brain of the relevant cognitive being, and that the latter are L1-
entities in their own right. In the eyes of some – the mind-brain identity theory – L2 
entities are indeed identical with these L1 physical counterparts. But L2-entities should 
never be confused with the L1-entities that they are about, nor with the L1-entities that 
precede them and participate in their etiology.  
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Our beliefs belong to level 2, the objects which such beliefs are about to Level 1. Level 
1 includes also immense quantities of further objects about which no beliefs will ever 
be formulated. The (correct) belief that human beings can know, at best, only small 
fragments of level 1 reality, should not, however, lead to the conclusion that there are 
no L1-entities or that L2-entities are not about L1-entities. It is a fallacy to infer from 
the proposition that knowledge is partial, and that any given belief may be mistaken, to 
the conclusion that every belief may be mistaken (indeed fundamentally, radically, 
metaphysically mistaken). This remains a fallacy when confined to the specific domain 
of the EHR. 
5.3 L3-Entities: Data and Information 
We reserve the term ‘L3-entity’ for those components of linguistic or graphical 
structures (characters, strings, schemas) that the authors of these structures have 
selected in order to convey to others different kinds of mental contents. L3-entities are 
used for communication amongst cognitive beings. We find examples of each in several 
forms, in both paper-based and electronic health records as well as in other systems 
such as terminologies and ontologies. More closely related to the main topic of this 
paper, we find them also in HL7 specifications and messages. 
L3-entities as defined here are a special sort of L1-entity with which specific 
communicative and descriptive functions are associated. Where any individual 
character and character string, whether on a sheet of paper or as a rendering on a 
computer screen, is an L1-entity, it is an L3-entity if and only if it is intended to be 
about some other entity. This intended aboutness must have been assigned by the 
cognitive being who assigned these functions to the entity in such a way that it is 
understandable to other cognitive beings on the basis of the conventions in use in the 
relevant community of cognitive beings.  
A specific form of aboutness is denotation: some linguistic (or graphical) construct is 
used to refer to some L1-entity. An example is the ‘c’ in ‘e = mc2’, the ‘c’ which was 
just (say, 2 milliseconds ago) in front of the reader’s eyes and which denotes the speed 
of light, in contrast to the ‘C’ in ‘Charles N. Mead’ (as it appears here in front of your 
eyes). The latter is not an L3-entity, since it denotes nothing at all, and even the string 
‘Charles N. Mead’ itself is only an L3-entity when it is used with the intention to refer, 
for example to that particular entity, well known in the HL7 community, as Charles N. 
Mead. 
5.4 L4-Entities: Identifiers in Reality 
It is to avoid ambiguities of the sort just sketched that identifiers, and more precisely 
unique identifiers, are introduced with the intention of denoting specific entities – 
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typically L1-entities – unambiguously. Examples are the Employer Identification 
Numbers (EINs) introduced by the IRS to uniquely identify business entities in the 
United States, and the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) that uniquely identify cars 
throughout the world. Other identifiers are the serial numbers of pieces of medical 
equipment, social security numbers, driving license numbers, bank account numbers, 
and so forth. 
Under the realism-based view that we adhere to, such identifiers are entities in their 
own right – we shall refer to them henceforth as ‘L4-entities’. They are, by virtue of 
their dependence on human acts in some ways comparable to L2-entities; but they are 
nevertheless entities of a distinct type. L2-entities are in a sense solipsistic; where any 
particular L2 entity depends on a specific cognitive being (our respective beliefs about 
the beauty of Barbra Streisand’s nose cannot be identical to any belief about her nose 
on the part of any other person), L4-entities, in contrast, can be shared by multiple 
cognitive beings. Like laws and constitutions they belong to the realm of social entities 
agreed upon by a community, and are in this respect similar to names. Note that neither 
identifiers nor names are L3-entities; but they can be expressed by means of L3-
entities. Some particular person’s social security number (SSN) might be expressed as 
‘057-879-6096’ and also as ‘057-879-6096’. There are then two L3-entities – one in 
italics and one in bold face – that express one SSN. The SSN itself is the L4-entity and 
as such is not ‘present in’ this paper, or in that tax form, or in this other legal document, 
but rather ‘expressed’, ‘concretized’, ‘realized’, through distinct L3-entities in all of 
these various different ways.  
6. Conclusion 
Clearly, one cannot hold HL7 responsible for mistakes committed because of mistaken 
interpretations of its own documentation – except where these mistakes arise because 
the latter is in so many fundamental respects open to multiple conflicting 
interpretations. Even HL7 experts struggle with questions such as “Aren’t two acts with 
the same id one and the same?”12 Unfortunately for HL7, the problems here do not 
seem to be just a matter of documentation. Indeed we find in the RIM the class 
EntityHeir, which is defined as ‘a subtype of Entity defined solely as a work-around for 
the lack of support of the reflexive closure of generalization relationships (i.e. “Entity 
is-an Entity”) by the current set of tools’. In the rationale for the introduction of this 
class we are told that its use ‘is entirely dictated by the (excusable) shortcomings of 
certain tools and data-structures used in the HL7 methodology, and have [sic] no 
conceptual meaning’. If the tools and data-structures used by HL7 are, as is here 
admitted, problematic; and if, as the reader can easily establish for himself by 
inspection, the result is documentation which is unintelligible except to some few 
members of the very small core of individuals responsible for creating and maintaining 
its various fixes from day to day, then why continue to use them? Why not take 
  Interdisciplinary Ontology Conference 2009  11
advantage of more realistic paradigms, which would be not only more simple and more 
reliable, but also easier to document, to understand, and to apply in practice? 
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